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1.

INTRCl>UCTION

During the past two decades, there has been a gro,ring consensus both
on the usefulness of social cost-benefit analysis for project and
expenditure evaluation in developing economies, and on the general
procedures by which shadow prices should be deterainecl.

If a nn project

is viewed as a perturbation in the economy, then its consequences (and

hence the shadow prices) depend critically on the salient features of the
economy.

For instance, if the economy is open to foreign trade and there

are tariffs, then the induced changes in domestic demand and supply of
goods affect the public revenue from tariffs.

If, on the other hand, the

economy is closed, then there are general equilibrium changes in domestic
prices which, in turn, affect the welfare of various individuals in the
economy.

It is important, therefore, to identify the relevant structure

of the economy.
The fact that we are interested in social cost-benefit analysis
indicates a belief that market prices may not accurately reflect social
costs, that is, there are some important distortions in the econ011y which
need to be explicitly identified.

Moreover, reasonable individuals 111ay

differ over the appropriate social welfare function and, hence, on the
appropriate social weights (which should be auociated with the aains and
loans to different individuals and to the government) to be employed in
aggregating the full consequences of a project.

Therefore, the role of

social weights in determining shadow prices neecls to be clearly
distinguished from the role of the critical structural features of the
economy.
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1
This paper focusses on shadow wage determination,
and it makes two

contributions.

First, it emphasizes certain features of the economy which

have important consequences for the shadow ,rage in many U>Cs, but which

have not received the attention they deserve.

Among them are the internal

structure of the agricultural and the industrial sectors, the
international trade environ.aent, and the mechanism which equilibrates the
economy to the perturbation caused by the new project.
these features is discussed below.)

(Our modelling of

Second, we develop a framework to

identify those reduced fora parameters which capture the iq,act that
various critical features of the economy have on the shadow wage. 2

Our

formulae for the shadow wage can, therefore, be specialized to a variety
of technological, behavioral and institutional hypotheses.
Indeed, one of the lessons that has been learned in the past two
decades is that there is enormous diversity within LDCs, and a set of
specific assumptions which may be appropriate for one country will not be
appropriate for others.

That is precisely why it is important to

construct a general framework, which includes as special cases all of the
co1D111only discussed hypotheses.

We, therefore, do not argue here whether

there is or is not industrial unemployment, whether the level of
industrial unemployment is or is not affected by employment decisions in
the industrial sector; whether migration of agricultural workers to the
industrial sector is or is not well described by the Barris-Todaro

hypothesis; whether there is surplus land or surplus labor in the
agricultural sector;

whether the agricultural population is relatively

homogenous or there are ,ride disparities within this population; whether
the government does or does not set tariffs at optimal levels.

Instead.
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we show how the same formulae for the shadow wage can be specialized to
these and other hypotheses, and examine what iq,lication this has, in
turn. on the magnitude of the shadow wage.
We derive a number of new results concerning the qualitative
Many of these

relationship between the shadow wage and the aartet wage.

results are robust; that is, they are valid for a wide ran1e of
uderlying parameter values.

The importance of robustness Ues in the

fact that obtaining the precise nuaerical estimates for some of the
critical parameters is often difficult.

In addition, we have been able to

synthesize the previous wort on shadow wages. and to obtain previously
known results as particular specializations of our more general approach.
This synthesis helps to identify the precise sources of difference among
the existing results.
The main components of our framework are the following.
(i) The Stncture of Agricultural Sector:

The creation of industrial

eaployzent often induces migration of agricultural workers to the
industrial sector.

The effect of this migration on the shadow wage is

determined, in part. by how the welfare of those who remain in the
agricultural sector is influenced by the general eq11ilibri11111 consequences
of aigration on agricultural prices, wages and earnings.

These. in turn,

depend on the institutional mechanisms which allocate land. wort, and
output among various individuals within the agricultural sector.
a simple example.

Consider

If agricultural wages rise due to migration, then the

(net) sellers of labor (landless workers and small landowners) gain. while
the net buyers of labor (large landlords) lose.

If the society is averse

to inequality then, in this case, there may be a net social gain which
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would reduce the magnitude of the shadow wage.
in

a

We capture these effects

aodel of an agricultural sector with heterogenous individuals in

which the distribution of earnings is endogenously determined.
(ii)

The Industrial Sector:

It has rece11tly been araued that there

are important relationships between the wages paid to the imluatrial
worker• and their H.! output.

Several alternative explanations of such

relationships have been offered~ wases may affect the quality of a
firm's applicant pool, the efficiency with which a given worker works, or
the workers' turnover rates.

We represent the industrial sector in a

manner that exhibits these effects.

Our for1111lation is consistent with

many alternative wage determination mechanisms, including those which take
into account wage-productivity relationship.
(iii)

The Xigra tion of Labor between Sectors:

has focussed primarily on two cases:

The literature thus far

where there is no endogenous

migration or where the migration is governed by a Barris-Todaro type
hypothesis.

Our general model of migration subsumes these two cases.

Also, our determination of the shadow wage takes into account many of the
general equilibrium effects of endogenous migration which have often been
ignored in earlier studies.
(iv)

Foreign Trade Environment:

Kost studies on the shadow wage

assuae an open economy in which there are no deviations between the

domestic and the international prices.

Empirical evidence on I.DCs, on the

other hand, points out that there exist substantial price distortions.

We

therefore take into account such distortions and show that these
distortions may exert a first order effect on the magnitude of the shadow
wage.

In addition, we examine the case in which the distortions are being

s
set at socially optimal levels, and analyze their implications for the
shadow wage.

le also consider the case in which the economy is closed to

foreian trade.
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(v)

Equilibrating Mechanisms in the Economy:

The consequences of new

employment creation depend on how the economy arrives at a new
equilibri11&. 4

Bow the economy equilibrates, in turn, depends on which

instr11ments can be potentially controlled by the government, which of
these instr..ents are left unchanged when the new eaployaent is created,
and how the govermnent changes the remaining instr..ents.

There are two

situations in which the issue of how the economy equilibrates may be
ignored:

first, if the government does not possess any instrmnent of

control at all and, second, if the government sets every available
instr11aent at its socially optimal level.

Given the observed behavior of

governments, both of these extremes appear unlikely.
the impact of alternative equilibrating
(vi) Distributive Judgments:

We therefore assess

■echanis■ s.

The evaluation of public projects

depends both on illtertemporal and interpersonal trade-offs (that is, the
social valuation of the income of different individuals relative to that
of investment).

These value judgments are represented in our formulae

through clearly identifiable parameters.

2.

THE BASIC MODEL

Rather than to begin with the general model, we first introduce a
stripped-down version, to help focus ideas.

Subsequent sections show how

this basic model can be both generalized and specialized.

In the model of

an open economy described below, the goverDl!lent exercises its control on

6

the agricultural sector only indirectly. through (at DJ&t) the imposition
of commodity taxes and subsidies on peasants' net surplus.S The govenunent
propose, to undertake an industrial project which will create new
employment.

Our objective is to calculate the social cost (the shadow

wage) of this employment creation.6

We ass1111e at present that there is no

endogenous migration between the agricultural and the ind•strial sectors.
the agricultural sector consists of homogene011s family farms. and the
industrial wage is rigid. 7
Agricultural Sector:

Other specifications are considered later.

The agricultural sector's population is Nl, and

A is total (agricultural) land which is owned equally within the
agricultural sector.8

a"" A/Nl is land per worker, and Ll is the number

of hours worked by each worker.
constant returns to scale.

The production technology exhibits

Ye can therefore write: X

Ll) as the output of an agricultural worker.

=X(A/N1 ,

Ll)

=X(a,

An agricultural worker's

consumption of agricultural and industrial goods is denoted by (xl, yl).
The surplus of the agricultural good per agricultural worker is Q "" X
xl.

~

The relative price of the agricultural good in terms of the

industrial good is denoted by p.

An agricultural worker's budget

constraint is

(1)

A.Ji agricultural worker chooses xl, yl, and Ll, subject to the above

budget constraint, to maxi~ize his utility.

The resulting level of

utility depends on p and Nl, and it is represented by the indirect

7

utility function:

av1

(2)

ap
where •xa

vl

1
= 1 Q

=vl(p,

> o,

= olnX/olna

Nl).

Then

av1

1

1

and--..-= - 1 plaxa/N
oN.1

<O

is the elasticity of the agric11ltural output per

worker with respect to the land per worker, and 1i is the (positive)
aarginal utility of income to a worker in sector i.

For later use, define 'Qp

= olnQ/olnp,

and •Qa

= 81nQ/Blna

as the

elastic Hies of. the surplus per agricultural worker with respect to its
price, and with respect to the land per agricultural worker.

Though the

usual restrictions on utility and production functions do not predict the
sign of •Qp•

we assume here that 'Qp

agricultural land.

> O.

'Qa depends on the scarcity of

If land is not scarce, then •Qa = 0, and sxa = O.

brevity in interpreting our results, we assume throughout that 1
0, that is, land is moderately scarce.

For

> IQa 2

The modifications for other values

of elasticities are straightforward.
Industrial Sector:

Industrial population is

Nl.

Ye ass1111e that an

industrial worker supplies L2 hours of work which are fixed due to
technological considerations; a JDOre general case, however, can be
easily worked out.

An industrial worker's cons11111ption of agricultural and

industrial aoods is denoted by (x2,
of the industrial good.

(3)

px2 +

y2

=

Y

y2),

and w ia his ,rage income in terms

The budget constraint of an industrial worker is

8

AD industrial Yorker chooses x2 and y2 to maximize his utility.
L2 is fixed, ye yrite the indirect utility as: y2

> 0,

(4)

av2

and -

2
2
Define exp c -alnx /8lnp, and

2

Bxy

2 2

= - Ax

Since

y2(p, y). Then

s

<0

2

.

c a1nx /8lnY as the

elasticities of an industrial yorker's consumption

of the agricultual

good with respect to its price, and with respect to wage income.

These

elasticities are positive because the consUllption goods are assumed to be
normal.
The output of an industrial worker is Y c Y(k, L2), where ks K/N2 is
the capital stock per industrial worker, and I is the total industrial
capital stock.

There may be both private and public firms in the

industrial sector, but all firms pay the same wage to their workers and
the profits of private firms are entirely taxed away .

.

Market Eguilibri11111:

N is the total population, and

The supply of the industrial good is used either for cons11111ption or for
investment, I.

Bence

Yhere My is the net import of the industrial good.

Similarly, the
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balance between the aupply and the demand of the agricultural good
requires

(7)

where Xx is the net import of the agricultural 1oocl.

The foreign tracte

balance is given by

where P denotes the international relative price of the agricultural good.
P is fixed under the small country assumption, but this can be easily
relaxed.
For later use, we obtain an alternative expression for investment.
Substitution of (1), (3), (7), and (8) in (6) yields

That is, investment equals the retained part of the industrial output
(after deducting industrial wage payment) and the net revenue from trlcle
taxes.

Eguilibratipg Mechanism:

Creation of industrial employment changes

the sectoral populations which, in turn, alters the demand and supply of
various goods.

The social impact of employment creation thus depends on

the particular equilibrating change which occurs. We asa11J11e here that the
traded quantities, M and M, change to maintain the equilibrium
X
y
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between the supply and the demand of the agricult ural good, (7), and
investm ent changes to maintain the equilibr ium in the industri al goods
aarket.

That is, the governm ent does not change its tariff policy.

Alterna tive equilibr ating mechanisms are ezamined later.

3.

3A.

DETERMINATION OF THE SHADOW WAGE

Shadoy Jage in the Basic Model

Define an additive Bergson- Samuels on social welfare function

where I is concave and increasi ng in V.

If 6 is the social value of the

margina l investm ent, then the current value of the aggrega te social
welfare is given by the Hamilto nian

(11)

H = J + 61

in which I is given by (9).
If the shadow

(12)

I

c

-

wage

is denoted bys, then

1
6

The industri al good is the numerai re througho ut the paper.
in (12) is the net social loss from employment creation . 9

The first term
The second

11

term represents the direct contribution of the newly employed worker.
This contribution is excluded from the calculation of the shadow wage
because the fruits of employment creation should not be counted Yhile
computing its cost.10
An explicit expression for (12) is derived from (11).

r Cw2 - w1] - r~l

(13)

s = y - 1

(14)

Z = Q(l - •Qa) + x2

pXeX + (P - p)Z. Yhere
a

>0

To obtain the above expressions. ye have used (2), (4). and (S), and
~i is social value (weight) of
a marginal increase in the income of a yorker in sector i.

Each of the four terms in the expression (13) represents a distinct
social effect of moving an agricultural yorker to the industrial sector.
The first term is the direct cost of the wage payment to the nnly
employed industrial worker.
larger shadow wage.

Naturally. a larger aarket wage implies a

The second teni captures the chanse in the welfare of

the Yorker Yho has moved.

The third term represents the effect of reduced

congestion on agricultural land.

Specifically, a migrant worker releases

land area a. which adds plex 1 to the income of those remaining in the

agricultural sector.

A higher congestion on agricultural land. therefore.

corresponds to a lower shadow wage.
The last term captures what we call the seneral equilibri•m effect of
employment creation on the demand and supply of the agricultural good.
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This can be seen as follows.

The agricultural surplus decreases directly

by Q because now there is one less agricultural worker.

The agricultural

surplus increases indirectly. on the other hand. by an amount QaQa because
of the extra land which has now become available to those in the
agricultural sector.

Also, the newly arrived industrial worker cons1111es

x2 of the agricultural good.
agricultural good is therefore
increased imports.

The net shortfall in the supply of the

z.

as in (14). which is met through

:&nploymept creatiop thus increases the pet

agricultural imports.

The gain or loss in the goverwnt revenue then is

(P- p)Z. which is the last term in (13).
lfuch of the literature on shadow ,rages has ignored this general
equilibrium effect by assuming that there is no price distortion; that
is.pc P.

Empirical studies indicate, however, that not only is this

ass11mption incorrect but, in fact. the price distortions in many
developing economies are often large..11

Aho. if the government 'ire re to

set the domestic prices at their socially optimal levels then, as we shall
see, the optimal prices generally entail price distortions. 12

A simple example might help in understanding the practical
consequences of price distortions.

Suppose the domestic price of food is

twice (half) the international price, and the ,rorkers spend roughly half
of their income on food.

Then. ass11ming that investment is highly scarce

(that is 6 is very large), that the agricultural land is not scarce. and
that the ,rorkers' earnings in the two sectors are roughly equal. we find
from (13) that the shadow wage is half (twice) the market wage.

In

contrast, the shadow wage equals the market wage if the general
equilibrium effects are ignored.

Quite plausible parameters therefore

13

show that the magnitude of the shadow wage will be substantially erroneous
if this general equilibrium effect is not taken into account.

3B.

Special Cases

Many of the results which have been prominent in the literature - and

some new results which have not previously been noted - can be obtained as
special cases of the ezpression

(13).

The specializations entail various

specific assumptions concerning the technology and the nature of
government policy.
(i)

(lS)

Highly Scarce Capital:

In this case,

6 is very large, and

s Cw+ (P - p)Z

If the capital is highly scarce, then the shadow wage is higher
(lower) than the market wage if the domestic price of the agricultural
good is lower (higher) than its international price,

Obviously, the

shadow wage equals the market wage if there are no price distortions.
(ii)

No Price Distortions:

A

direct implication of (13) is that:

ln the absence of price distortions. the shadow wage is less than the
aarket wage. so long as industrial workers are better-off than

acricultural workers,

Other special cases considered below alao employ

the assumption of no price distortions.
(iii)
Ai.
,_13

Utilitarianis~:

Utilitarianism implies that yi

c

v1 ,

and ~i =

Denote the value of the marginal product of an agricultural worker by
.
X..Ll •
Th a t 1s,
g ,_
= P-i,

production implies l = l

a8

Constant returns to scale in agricultural
+ I L1 and, hence,
L

14

pXeXa cpl - g.

(16)

Then,(13 ) can be written as

• Cw_

1 cv2 _ v1 1
6

- 11 (pX - g)
6

Thia correspo nds to a result obtained by Little and Mirrlees (1968). Sten
(1972). and Newbery (1972).
(iv) Fixed Labor Hours:

If the labor hours supplied by an

agricul tural worker are fixed and equal to the hours supplied by an
industr ial worker. then the utility of an agricult ural worker can be
expresse d as a function of his income and the price he faces. that is:
c

V(p,pl) and

v2

= V(p,w).

v1

Moreove r, I is concave in a worker's income. 14

Express ion (13) then yields

(17)

Thus, the shadow wage exceeds a weighted average of the market wage and
the margipa l product of an agricult ural worker.
(v)

Output Maximizing Society:

In addition to the ass1111ptions aade

in (iv) above, if it is assumed that a society aaxiaize s the level of its
aggrega te output without distingu ishing between investme nt and

consump tion. or between the consuap tion of differen t workers . then Y
equals a worker' s income, and 6 equals one. 15 Thus the inequal ity in (17)
is replaced by an equality , and

lS

( 18)

s = g

That is, the shadow wage equals the value of the marginal product of an
agricultura l worker.

This was one of the earliest views on the magnitude

of the shadow wage.

This view implied a zero shadow wage, if the marginal

product of agricultura l labor ia zero. 16

4.

4A.

LABOR JIOBILITY, INDUSTRIAL WAGE. AND INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTIVITY

A Geperal Model

Unemployment and endogenous mobility of workers across sectors are
COIDJIIOD

features of many developing economies.

We propose here a general

11odel of labor mobility which subsuie~ many of the existing aodels. The
utility level of an unemployed worker is denoted by VU, and the nuiber of
unemployed is denoted by NU.

For simplicity, transfer arrangement s from

the employed to the unemployed workers are ignored here, and it is ass'llllled
that the unemployed workers have a fixed level of utility.
The agricultura l population is expressed (in a reduced form) as a
function of the relative price and the level of industrial employment.

(As explained later in footnote 18, the dependence of

N1

on w is alre.ty

i11plicit in the above expression) .

Obviously then. the level of

llJlemployment is also a function of

p

and N2, since

16

Next. consider the determinati on of industrial wages.

There are

several alternative hypotheses concerning how the industrial wage is
determined.

To obtain an integrated view of the implication s of these

alternative hypotheses on the shadow wage, we represent the industrial
wage schedule through the following reduced form function. 17

It can be verified that the above reduced form representat ions of
labor mobility and industrial wage determinatio n take into account the
relationshi p between N1 and w. 18 Also, note that (21) is consistent with
the view that the government cannot perfectly control the level of
industrial wage, or with the view that if the govermient is setting the
wage optimally, then the optimal waae may depend on other variables in the

economy.19
Many recent theories have suggested that the productivit y of
industrial workers might depend on other variables in the economy, such as
the industrial

wage

and the rate of unemploymen t.

Such

a

dependence is

represented as

where the first two arguments of the function Y continue to represent the

direct effect of the capital and labor hours on industrial productivit y,

17

while the last two argumeDts reflect all of the indirect effects. 20
An advantage of using general functions like (19), (21), and (22) is
that the resulting shadow wage formulae are quite free of the precise
nature of the institutions in the economy.

(The values of parameters in

these formulae would, of course, depend on the institution s.)

As we shall

see below, these functions are easily specialized to represent various
specific hypotheses.
For later use, we define the following elasticitie s.
E

From (22), 'Ye

dlnY/dinN2 is the elasticity of per worker industrial output with

respect to industrial employment.

Given that the price is fixed in the

present model, this elasticity captures all of the indirect effects of the
perturbatio n in the economy on industrial productivit y. From (19), n =
-dN 1 /dtt' is the nuber of workers who leave the a1ricultura l sector if one
industrial job is created.

And, from (21), e
E dlnw/dlntt' is the·
we
elasticity of industrial wage with respect to industrial employment. 21
The relevant Hamiltonian is given by (9) and (11) in which

and N1 •

1r

and Y are given by (19), (21) and (22) respectively .

the correspondi ng shadow wage according to (12).

We derive

This can be rearranged

to yield

(24)

we

we

- Ye

Ye
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where

The expression (24) reduces to (13) if n
That is:

s

1, •Ye

c

0, and •we

s

O.

If the level of unemployment is left unchanged by the creation

of industrial employment, if t.he industrial wage is fbed, and if here are
no indirect effects on imustrial productivity, then the above shado,.. wage
is the same as that derived in the basic 11odel.

Thus, the model in

Section 3 and its specializations can be viewed as special cases of the
more general model presented here.
The effect of employment creation on labor mobility and the effect of
this on the shadow wage can be decomposed into three parts.

First, n

migrants from the agricultural sector join the pool of unemployed and;

is the net loss in the welfare for each worker, after taking into account
the gain from reduced congestion on agricultural land [see (25)].
welfare loss is thus •n/6 in (24).

The

Second, one of the unemployed

workers receives the newly created industrial job, and the welfare gain

due to this is¼ [w2 - WU].

Third, labor mobility influences the

shortfall Zin the aaricultural good,

This can be seen in (26), in which

Q{l - •Qa>n is the decrease in agricultural supply.
The effect of employment creation on the imustrial waae is felt
through

Ewe·

If, for example, the industrial wage increases with

industrial employment, then the new project will increase the wage payment
to the infr1J11arginal industrial workers,

This, in turn, makes them

19

better-off, but at the expense of public revenue.

The net of these two

effects is represented in the fifth term in (24').

The induced change in

the industrial wage also affects the net shortfall in agricultual good,
as can be seen in the express ion (26).

Finally, the loss or gain due to

the indirect effects on industrial productivity is represented by the last
term in the right hand side of (24').

4'B.

Barris-Todaro Misration Hypothesis

A special case of the above general aodel of labor mobility is the
Barris-Todaro hypothesis [Barris and Todaro 0970)), according to which a
aigrant from the agricultural sector finds an industrial job with

probability N2/(N - Nl), and becomes unemployed otherwise.

Migration

continues until the expected utility level of a potential migrant equals
the utility level of an agricultural worker.

This hypothesis is therefore

a special case of (19) in which

where, it will be recalled, vl is a function of p and Nl, and v2 is a
fllDction of p and w.

For simplicity, we assume here that the social

welfare function is utilitarian, that is, Y(V)
■ore

c

V and pi

c

Ai.

While a

aeneral approach is easily possible, as we shall see later, this

assumption enables us to ignore here the issue of defining the social
welfare over the ex ante versus the ex post utilities of workers.
to keep N'll positive, we ass'DJlle that y2
meaningful otherwise.
Perturbing (27), we obtain

> v 1 > vu.

Also,

The above model is not

20

(28)

Substitution of the above in (24) yields

(29)

where Z is given by (26).
On comparing (29) with the earlier expressions for the shadow wage.

(13)

and (24), it is clear that the shadow wage now does not depend on

the differences in the utilities of different workers.

This is what we

would espect since all workers have the same expected utility in the
present mode1.22
Special Cases:

{i) Consider the special case in which there is no

congestion on agricultural land, there are no induced effects of
employment creation on industrial wage and productivity, and the domestic
price equals the international price.

Then, from (29), the shadow

wage

equals the market ,rage. regardless of the society's valuation of
investment versus consumption.

This well known result 23 reversed the

presu.mption of the earlier literature that the shadow wage is smaller than
the

■ arket

wage, that its value is critically dependent on the society's

iJl.tertemporal valuation, and that it approaches the market waae only when
the social value of investment (relative to cons1111ption) is very high.
The basic reason for this result is that the migration in the
present special case does not change the aggregate level of utility or
consUJDption in the economy and, hence, the only effect of employment

21

creation is on investm ent.
fixed. since •xa "'

o.

The utility level of an agricult ural worker is

and the utility level of an industri al worker is

fised. since there is no effect of migratio n on the aggregat e expected
utility.

Since the only effect of creating an industr ial job is on

investae nt (which. from (9). is reduced by the market waae), it follo,,s
that the shadow wage equals the market wage. 24
(ii) Conside r an output maximiz ing society with land congesti on, in
which there are no price distorti ons, and there are no induced effects on
industr ial wage and product ivity.
i11plies ~l

c

6"' 1,

v1

= pX, and

Recall that the output maximiz ation

v2

= w. Substitu tion of these in (28) and

(29) yields

Thus. s

< w, since aXa < 1 from the standard propert ies of producti on

function .

This result shows, in a simple setting, that the effect of land

congest ion is to reduce the shadow wage. 25

5.

Nany

INDUSTRIAL WAGE DETERMINATION

recent studies have postulat ed that the net output (net of

hiring and training costs, for example) of an industr ial firm aay be a
function of, among other things, the wage this firm pays. the wages other
firms pay. and the level of industri al 11nen1ployment: and that these
effects, in turn, influenc e the wages that are paid to workers. 26

In
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this section, we show how these wage determination mechanisms can be
treated as special cases of the model presented earlier.

We also show

that our •odel can be employed to study wage determination in aany more
institutional settings than those considered in the existing literature.
Kost of the general points can be established in the context of the
wage-productivity hypothesis.

This hypothesis suaaests that the

efficiency per work hour, b, depends on the wage 27 ; that is, b
where b w-> 0 is the relevant range, and Y

c

Y(k, bL2 ).

c

b(w),

The institutional

setting which has be&n emphasized in the literature is the one in which
private industrial firms minimize the labor cost per efficiency unit,
2

w/b(w)L , and the resulting wage is characterized by

(31)

Thus:

b

w

c

b/w

The level of the efficiency wage paid by firms is a fixed

technological parameter.

The substitution of ewe

c

O and 8Te

c

O in (24)

yields the corresponding shadow wage.
Now consider an alternative institutional setting in which the
industrial firms are publicly owned (that is, the level of industrial
eaployment is publicly determined) and the govermient instructs firms to
maximize their profits (this directive aay not always be socially optimal,
as we

shall soon see).

The firms then maximize (Y - w), and the

industrial wage is characterized by

23

where YL

= ay/a(bL2 ).

Clearly in this case the industrial wage depends

on the level of industrial employwient.
is represented by eYe
a1nb/alnY.

c

The induced effect on productivity

&yLebwewe' where 'YL

2

c

a1nY/a1n(bL ), and 'bw

c

Substitution of these in (24) yields the correspondin& shadow

wage.

If, on the other hand, the government sets the optiaal wa1e taking
into account the wage-efficiency effects then, •sing the relevant
Hamiltonian, it can be verified that the optimal waae depends on the
variables in both sectors of the economy and that, in general, the
resulting wage schedule does not entail an equalization of the social
weight on investment,&, and the social weight on the income of an
industrial worker ~2.28
For illustration, consider the simple cue in which there is no
price distortion, and there is no endogenous migration.

The socially

optimal industrial wage is then obtained from (9), (10) and (11) as

(33)

Clearly, P2 does not always equal 6 because of the wage-efficiency
effects.

Now consider two further special cases in which the social

weiahts are exogenously specified.

First, if 6 is very large relative to

6, then (32) and (33) are the same.

This should not be surprising, since

if the society maximizes investment, then the optimal wage paid by the
government is the same as what it would be if public sector managers are
instructed to maximize their profit.
bw

c

O.

2
Second, if ~

c

&, then (33) yields

Thus, in an output maximizing society, the optimal industrial
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wage is sufficie ntly high, so that the effects of wage on product ivity do

not exist anymore.

It follows in the present case, then, that the optimal

industr ial wage is higher in an output maximiz ina society than what it is
in an investme nt

■ aximizing

society , or in an econcimy in which private

finis minimize the cost of labor in efficien cy units.
For other hypothes es concerni ng industr ial waae 4etemia ation, the
relevan t issues are quite similar to those already 4iscusae d aboTe.

For

instance , the wage-qu ality hypothe sis posits that the wage paid by a firm
(relativ e to other firms and relative to the agricul tural sector) induces
a sorting of workers accordin g to their quality.

If the private finis

minimiz e their unit cost of labor in efficien cy units then, in a sym•tri c

equilibri 11m, the wage is given by (31), where b

c

b(w,

N2). 29

Clearly,

therefo re, employment creation has an induced wage effect as well as an
indirec t effect on product ivity.
Similar ly, accordin g to the labor-tu rnover hypothe sis, the training
cost to a firm (which reduces its net output) depends on the quit rate of
workers .

If private firms minimize their total labor cost then, in a

symnetr ic equilibr ium, it turns out that the industr ial waae depends on
urban unemployment rate and on the number of workers in the aaricult ural
sector.

It is clear therefor e, that this case as well as those arisina in

alternat ive institut ional settings , can be treated as special cases of the
1110del develope d in Section 4A.
We have thus identifi ed the propert ies of the industri al sector
which are critical in the determi nation of the shadow wage, and have shown
how the relevan t reduced form expressi ons depictin g the industri al wage
schedule and the migratio n mechanism can be speciali zed to a variety of
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technolog ical, behaviora l. and institutio nal hypothese s.

The same reduced

foni expressio ns (and therefore the same formulae for the shadow wage) are
consisten t with quite different technolog ical and behaviora l
a11uptio ns; while the same technolog ical ass1111ptions, in conjuncti on
with different behavior al postulate s, yield aarkedly different shadow
wases.

6.

STIUCI'URE OF THE AGJUCULTUJW.. SECTOI

Our earlier specifi_o tion that the agricultu ral sector consists of
homogenous fuiily farms is restrictiv e.

A full investiga tion of the

impact that alternativ e institutio nal structure s within the agricultu ral
sector have on the shadow wage requires a more detailed model containin g,
among other things. different classes of individua ls (landowne rs,

sharecrop pers and landless workers, for exaaple), the migration behavior
of these classes, the reallocat ion of land entailed by migration , the
mechanism s which determine agricultu ral wages and earnings, and the tax
instrumen ts which the governmen t employs in the aaricultu ral sector.

A

perturbat ion of such a model due to industria l employment creation would
thus affect not only the distribut ion of welfare within the aaricultu ral
sector, but also the agricultu ral surplus and the level of public
investmen t.
For instance, if agricultu ral wages increase due to a reduction in
the agricultu ral populatio n then, as we pointed out earlier, the net
sellers of labor gain whereas the net buyers of labor lose.

If the

economy is closed to internatio nal trade (discussed later in Section 8)
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then a project has general equilibrium price effects; if the prices of
agricultural goods increase, then the net sellers of these goods gain
whereas the net buyers lose.

Also, migration aay affect the distribution

of rents and profits associated with land-ownership, particularly if the
new project induces some of the landowners to migrate to the urban sector.
The precise consequences of this would depend, of course, on the
blstitutional arrangements; in some economies, migrants do not lose
their right to receive 'rents' from their land, while fn others they do.
In addition, there may be induced effects on individuals' incentives (and
hence on their surplus and welfare) which are determined, in part, by the
rules for sharing output and work within families and between landowners
and sharecroppers. 30
In the remainder of this section we focus on the distributional
consequences of changes in agricultural

wages

and profits.

Specifically,

we reconsider the basic model (Section 2) with the following modifications
concerning the agricultural sector.
(i)

Betero1enous Farmers:

Consider an agricultural sector

consisting of a spectrum of landowning classes as well as landless
workers, who buy and sell their labor services.
aaricultural population in group h.

lb
N denotes the

An individual in group h has land

area Ah, and his net labor supply (that is, labor hours supplied minus the
labor hours employed on his farm) is L1 h.
denoted by h = I.

Clearly, A1 = 0, and L11

The landless workers are

> O.

The newly created

industrial job is awarded to one of the landless workers, and the
populations of various landownin1 groups remain unchanged.
of the rural wage rate (per hour) is represented as w1

=

The schedule
1

11

w (p, N

).
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Its elasticity with respect to the population of landless workers

is

denoted as , 1 c -dlnw 1 /dlnN 11 • N1Q continues to denote the total
we
agricultural surplus, where N1 =
Nlh is the total agricultural

2
h

population, and Q is the average agricultural surplus per member of the
agricultural population.
ne fist term in the right hand side of the social welfare function
(10) now becomes:

s =

w1 )), and the corresponding shadow wage

h

is given by

(34)

L N1hwcv1h(p,

w-

t [w2 - t 11 J

+ (P - p}Z + c

where

(35)

C = -

1
l>"

1 1

W

I

we

ne new term c, in (34} and (35), represents the induced effects of
industrial employwient creation
agricultural sector.

OD

the distribution of welfare in the

We assume here that the a1ricultural wage rate

increases if there are fewer landless workers, that is, a1
we

> O.

(As we

shall see below, this assumption is justified under certain plausible
conditions.)

nen, (34) and (35) show that the induced gains to the net

suppliers of labor reduce the shadow wage, whereas the induced losses to
the net buyers of labor increase the shadow wage.
have expected based on our earlier discussion.

This is what we would
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Though the above derivation of the shadow wage is consistent with a
variety of mechanisms for agricultural wage determination, we foc~s on the
case where the wage is determined from a clearing of agricultural labor
•arket, that is, from

L Nl~lh(p,

(36)

wl) = 0

h

If household h supplies L1 h hours of labor, and Ld hours of labor are used
1
on a unit land, then L1h = Lsh - A~d. Denote e~! = 81nL 1 h/81nw as
d

the elasticity of labor supply for household h, and eLw
81nLd/81nw1 as the elasticity of labor demand on a unit land.

Then a

11
1
perturbation of (36) with respect tow and N yields

e!e

(37)

c

t 11

t}

_r-1h(Lsht~!

+ A~defw>

h

It follows that a sufficient set of assumptions for (37) to be positive is
that the individuals' labor supplies are nondecreasing in the wage rate,
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and that the farm use of labor is decreasing in wage rate.

But even if

the labor supply curve is backward bending, (37) will still be positive,
provided increases in wage do not induce too large a reduction in labor
supply.

This assumption seems plausible, and we make it in the rest of

this section.
A special case worth noting here is that of an agricultural sector
consisting of two classes:
2).

landless workers and landlords (denoted by h:

2 12
Then from (36), t 11 = - / t •

Substituting this in (35), we obtain
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This express ion is quite intuiti ve since in the two class case. the
induced wage gain to the landles s is exactly equal to the loss to the
landlor ds.

If the society is averse to inequa lity (that is~ is
decreas ing in income ), 32 then a net social 1ain arises from this induced
transfe r from the poor to the rich.

From (34) and (38), therefo re, the

resulti ng social gain reduces the shadow wage.
(ii)

Land Rents:

If the government capture s some of the profits

(rents) in the agricu ltural sector, then the public revenue (and, hence,
the shadow wage) will be influen ced by migrat ion.

For brevity . we

consid er here a polar case in which the agricu ltural sector is organiz ed
through government-owned parute tals, or through private ly o,rned
paruta tals whose profits are entirel y taxed ayay.

N1 denotes the

popula tion of homogenous agricu ltural worker s. each of whom works for L1
.
hours and receive s a wage rate w1 per hour. The profit in agricul ture is
N1 (pX - w1L1 ), and this profit is now added to the investin ent express ion
(9).

The resulti ng shadow wage is given by (34), where now

(39)

where

aiw

c BlnL 1 /Blnw 1 is the labor supply elastic ity of an

agricu ltural worker . 33
The first term in the right hand side of (39) represe nts the induced
waae effect which we had investi gated earlie r.

In fact, this term is
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quite similar to the corresponding expression (38) in a two-class
agriculture.

This should not be surprising since, in the present model,
(p1i_ - w1 ) is the marainal

the aoverDJDent acts as the 'landlord•. 34

profit (wbich could be positive, zero or negative) from an hour of labor.
The second term in the right hand side of (39), therefore, represents the
loas of profit due to the migration of one agricultural worker, and due to
effect that this migration may have on the labor hours supplied by those
who remain in the agricultural sector.

N1L1 = ALd.

condition (36) n0,r becomes:
d

1 Lw)

> O,

and (l -

1

1

1 Lw 1 we)

Next, the labor aarket clearing

=

d

1

1 Lw/(eLw

+

1

This yields:

'~-) > o. 35

e
we

From

(34) and (39), therefore, we obtain the following result.

If there are no price distortions, if ipvestaent is highly scarce,
and if agricultural workers are paid po more than their
then the shadoy wage is higher than the market wage.
simple.

■ arginal

product,

The reasoning is

The migration of an agricultural worker, in the present case,

implies that the govermnent not only pays a higher wage to those who
remain in the agricultural sector, but it also loses some profit because
the total number of agricultural labor hours have decreased due to
migration. 36

The conventional belief that the shadow wage equals the

aarket wage when there is no distortion and when investment is scarce,
therefore, is incorrect in the present case.
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7.

SHADOW WAGE WI'Ill OPTIMAL PRICES

Throuahout our analysis, we have stressed the importance of the
deviation between the domestic and the international prices in the
determination of the shadow waae.
the domestic prices are deterained,
industrial employment is created.

Our results are valid reaardless of hoY
10

lona as they do not change as the

We now examine h01r the doaestic prices

would be set if they were being determined optimally, and ,rhat the optimal
prices, in turn, imply for the shadow wage.
For brevity, consider the basic model of the agricultural sector
(Section 2), ignore the induced effects on industrial productivity, and
asslllle utilitarianism and the Barria-Todaro hypothesis.
analysis is easily possible.)

(A

more general

The industrial wage is given by (21).

Differentiation of the relevant Hamiltonian, given by (9), (11) and (23),
with respect top, characterizes the optimal rate of subsidy on the
agricultural surplus as
tl
(.40)

P - P

=

t

N2w
Iexamp> - P £,rp + Mx
N1Q &Qp + N2 x2i~p
N(Q -

P

In the above expression, we have defined the following elasticities.
From (19), mp c d1~ 1 /dlnp is the elasticity of the agricultural
population with respect to the relative price and, from (21)# a

YI)

~

dlnw/dlnp is the elasticity of industrial wage with respect to price.

aQp

= dln(N 1Q)/dlnp

=

eQp + (1 - aQ )mp is the elasticity of total
8

agricultural surplus with
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respect to its price. and i 2 : -dlnx 2 /dlnp = e2 - e 2 e
is the
xp
xp
XY 'WJ)
own price elasticit y of the consuptio n of agricultu ral good by an
imdustria l worker. taking into account the induced effect of price on
wage.

It can be Terified from (27) that mp>

o.

and thus

'Qp

> O.

Expressio n (40) aay be substitute d back into (29) to obtain an
expressio n for the shadow wage. expressed in term of the •nderlyin g
reduced form general equilibrh un parameter s of the economy.
Specializ ation of this general formula is a straightfo rward matter.

Bere

we show that, under certain circumsta nces. whether the doaestic price is
hiaher or lower than the internatio nal price depends solely on the
direction of trade flows.
Specifica lly. if the induced effects on industria l wage and 011
agricultu ral land congestio n are not significa nt, that is, eXa and ewp are
negligibl e, then (40) yields: p

and if 6 is Tery large.

> P,

That is:

if Mx

l

O.

Alsop< P if M < 0,
X

The optimal domestic price of the

agricultu ral good is higher t)-'n its internatio nal price if the country
imports this good,

The reverse is true

if the country exports the

agricultu ral good, and if i11vestment is highly scarce.
Combining the above results with (29), we find that, if the domestic
price is being set optimally . then:
■ arket

The shadow yage is smaller thap the

,rage if th country imports the agricultu ral good,

The reverse is

tni, if the couptry exports the agricultu ral good and if ipvestmen t is
highly scarce.
Special case:

Among the very few studies on the shadow wage which do

not assue undistort ed trade are those by Dixit and Stern. 37 They

I
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consider a model in which the society maximizes investment, there is no
endogenous migration, the industrial wage equals agricultural income, and
the agricultural output does not depend on its price.

as 1. • p c O, w cpl, and X
1,rp

s

1, and 1~p

c

c

X(N1 ).

(I - x2 )aQp/x2.

that is:

6

➔

m,

These asslllllptions also imply:
Substitution of these in (40) yields the

result:

(41)

8.

ALTERNATIVE EQUILIBRATING MECHANISMS

There are two main points concerning how the shadow wage is affected
by the mechanism which brings the economy back into a (new) equilibrium
after a project is undertaken.

First, alternative equilibrating

mechanisms, in general, entail different social costs 38 and, hence, imply
different shadow wages.

Second, if all of the available policy

instr'llJllents are set at their socially optimal levels, then altenative
equilibrating mechani.s11s imply the same shadow wage.

Though l>oth of these

points hold in more general models, we examine them here in the context of
the simple model outlined in Section 2.
We have assumed so far that the traded quantities change in response
to the creation of industrial employment, while the domestic prices remain
1J.J1chuged.

Now consider an altenative mechanism in which a change in

domestic prices equilibrates the economy, while the traded quantities

39
remain unchanged.

A closed economy is clearly a special case of the
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present formula tion, since the traded quantiti es are always zero in such
an economy.
Using (7), the expressi on for investm ent, (9) can be restated as

in which Mx is assumed to be fixed.

In addition , equation (7) now

represen ts an explicit constra int on the economy. The industr ial
employm ent creation , therefo re, must be accompanied by a price change so
that this constra int remains satisfie d.

Express ion

(◄ 2)

along with (10),

defines the Hamilto nian (11), and

The middle term in the above expressi on is new, in comparis on to (12).
This term represen ts the indirect loss in social welfare due to the change
in

price which keeps (7) in balance .
A perturb ation of (7) yields

(◄ 4)

=

pZ

where recall that Z is the shortfa ll between the demand and supply of the
agricul tural good, induced by the industr ial job creation .
(14), and it is positive .

Therefo re:

Z is given by

The creatiop of ipdustr ial

emploV111ent is accompa nied by an increase ip the price of the agricul tual
good, if a chapge in the domestic price~ is the equilibr ating pechanis m.
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Using (43) and (44), ye obtain the folloying expression for the
shadow wage.

(45)

where

(46)

t

c

!

[N2~2x2 - Nl~lQ - 6Mx
6 N1QeQp + N2x 2 aip

Now contrast (13) and (45).

]

The two expressions for the shadow waae are

based on the same underlying model, but they differ in their equilibratin g

mechanisms.

Not surprisingl y, therefore, the only difference between the

expressions (13) and (45) is in their last term which, as we saw earlier,
represents the social cost of meeting the shortfall, Z.
Specificall y, in (13) the shortfall is removed through an increase
in the net agricultura l import and, as one would expect, the social cost
of meeting a unit of shortfall is simply (P - p).

In the present case, an

increase in the price of the agricultura l good removes the shortfall, and
the social cost of meeting a unit of shortfall is t, given by the
expression (46).

To understand this expression, note that a price

increase hurts industrial workers, helps agricultura l workers, and
increases (decreases) the public revenue if the net agricultura l import is
positive (negative).

Each of these three effects have societal

consequence s which are seen clearly in the numerator of the square bracket
in (40).
Next consider the case in which the government sets the available
policy instrwnents at their optimal levels.

It is intuitive that in this

case the social cost of alternative adjustment policies will be equalized
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and, thus, the shadow wage would be the same under alternative
equilibrating mechanisms.

This intuition can be verified as follows.

If

we derive the opti~al price in the present model, foll01ring the approach
of Section 7, then we find that the optimal price is characterized by

P - p

(47)

a::

t

where tis given by (46).

Thus, the social costs of meeting the

shortfall, and the shadow wage, are the same under the two equilibrating
mechanisms we have considered.
We now examine two special cases of (45).
(i)

(48)

Highly Scarce Invest~ent:

In this case, (45) and (46) yield

s = w-

Thus, whether the shadow wage is higher or lower than the aarket wage
depends simply on whether the country exports or imports the agricultural

aood.

This is because the only relevant gain or loss from the

equilibrating price increase in this case is due to the change in
investment, given by (42).

If Mx is positive then the society gains, and

the 1had01r wage is lower than the market wage, and the reverse happens if
M

X

is negative.

(ii)

Closed Economy:

If the economy is closed to international

trade, or if it is nearly self-sufficient, then W = O.
X
therefore, t = p(~ 2 -

~

1

2

)/6(£Qp + £

xp

From (46),

), which is negative if the
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agricultura l workers are worse-off than the industrial workers. 41
Substitutin g this in (45), we obtain the following result:

Ip a

closed

ecopomy. if the agricultura l workers are worse-off than the ipdustrial
workers, then the shadow wage is saaller thap the market yage.
The intuition behind this result is quite clear.

If agricultura l

workers are worse-off, then industrial employaent creation yields a direct
welhre gain to those who receive the newly created Jobs, and it yields an
indirect welfare gain to those who remain in the agricultura l sector due
to an increase in the price of agricultura l good, and due to the reduced
congestion.

These two effects lead to a reduction in the shadow wage.

A further special case of a closed econOllly is one in which investment
is highly scarce.

In this case, (48) yields:

wage equals the market wage.

s cw.

That is, the shadow

This has an interesting implication .

The

conventiona l belief that the shadow wage equals the market wage can be
interpreted as a limiting case (of highly scarce investment) in an open
economy without trade distortions , as well as in a closed economy.

9.

(i)

REMARKS

When individuals ' migration decisions are based on expected

utilities, then the shadow wage may be affected by whether the social
welfare is calculated on the basis of the ex ante or the ex post utilities
of individuals . -12

Consider the simple exa11ple of the Barris-Toda ro

hypothesis with no land congestion, and no induced effect on the
industrial wage.

Expression (23) is the social welfare of individuals

based on their ex post utilities.

Expressions (23) and (28) yield:
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dJ/dtil

c

(W2 - ,u, - {(W 1 - yu)(V2 - vu)/(v 1 - vu)}.

Since, v 2

> v1 , the

last expression is negative (zero) if Y is strictly concave (linear) in V.
Tlie social welfare of individuals based on their ex ante utilities, on the
other hand, is Jc Nl'(V 1 ); and thus:

dJ/dtil c O.

Using these

derivations it can be verified that if the society is averse to
inequality, then the shadow wage co.rrespondi ng to. a social welfare
function based on ex post utilities is higher than that correspondi ng to a
social welfare function based on ex ante utilities; and that the two
shadow wages are equal if the society is utilitarian . 43
simple.

Tlie reason is

In the present case, all individuals have the same ex ante

utilities. but the pool of unemployed becomes larger when new industrial
jobs are created.

There is an added social cost, therefore. if the

individuals ' ex post utilities matter to the society.
(ii)

We have emphasized above that the shadow wage depends on the

equilibratin g mechanisms within the economy.

There are some other

possibiliti es which might be important in this context.

First, it is

possible in some cases that a government manages its pol icy instruments
in a manner such that some markets do not clear.

As an extreme example,

if a government creates industrial employment without allowing other
variables (such as prices or traded quantities)
shortage of food might emerge in cities.

to change, then a

The government aay then attempt

to remove this shortage through non-price methods such as rationing and
queues.

The derivation of the shadow wage in such cases will have to take

into account the non-price methods which are employed to arrive at the
final quantity balances. 44
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Second, the economy may be in a temporary equilibriu m such that some
of the prices are rigid and some of the markets, other than that for
labor, are character ized by excess supply or demand.

In such cases, it is

necessary to base the shado..,, wage derivatio n on an explicit model of the
short term equilibriu m. 45
(iii)

The models we have analyzed can be easily enlarged to

accommodate a multiplic ity of goods, and to include additiona l instr11111ents
of policy.

For example, if the governmen t can maintain different relative

prices in the agricultu ral and the industria l sectors, denoted by
q

p and

respectiv ely, then it can be shown that the shadow wage in the basic

model is given by (13), provided we replace tbe last term in the right
hand aide of (13) by
(49)

(P -

p)(Q -

a dQ) ~ (P - q)x 2
da

ne intuition is obvious.

The govermne nt' s gain or loss due to the

general equilibriu m effects on the demand and supply of the agricultu ral

good is now valued different ly in the two sectors.

Moreover, (49) readily

aeneraliz es to the case of many goods if the prices and quantitie s are
interprete d as vectors.

We have developed such disaggreg ated models

elsewhere [Sah and Stiglitz (1983, 1984b)] to study the design of taxation
and pricing in U>Cs.

JO.

CONCLUSION

While the importanc e of using shadow prices and wages in the
evaluatio n of public expenditu re and projects has been widely recognize e
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in U>Cs. the correct magnitude of the shadow wage - and its relationship
to the market wage - have remained controversial.

The earliest studies on

shadow wages focussed on rual unemployment (open or disguised) in IJ>Cs.
and inferred from this that the opportunity coat of hirb.g new industrial
workers was low.

Sen (among others) though agreeing that the opportunity

cost - in the sense of forgone output - might be low, contended that the
shadow wage might nonetheless be high; wage payaents to additional
workers required diverting resources from (relatively JDOre valuable)
investment to consumption.

If investment was very valuable, then the

shadow wage equaled the market wage.
This view, in turn, was criticized by Barberger and Stiglitz for
ignoring the induced migration of agricultural workers to the industrial
sector.

If the workers earned fixed wages in the two sectors. then under

the Barris-Todaro hypothesis

that the expected wage in the industrial

sector equals the agricultural wage, they showed that the shadow wage was
equal to the market wage. regardless of the relative social ~•luation of
investment.

These earlier studies thus identified two of the iq,ortant

determinants of the shadow wage - the nature of intertemporal trade-off
and endogenous migration.
In this paper, we present a framework for shadow wage determb.ation
which. while incorporating the above issues. deals explicitly with many
salient features of U>Cs which are important but have not received the
attention they deserve.

These include:

domestic and international prices,

(ii)

(i)

the differences between

the equilibrating mechanisms in

the economy which determine, for example. whether the general equilibriu~
impact of industrial employment creation is to increase the relative price
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of the agricultural good or to increase its net import, (iii) the
aechanisms which determine the distribution of earnings within
agricultural and industrial sectors, and (iv) the consequences of
industrial employment creation on those who remain in the aaricultural
sector, for exU1ple,

through what we identify as conaestion effects.

Many of these aspects have first order effects on the
waae;

■ aanitude

of shadow

to ignore them would lead to misleading results.
Our method has been to identify those reduced form relationships for

describing the economy which are central to the determination of shadow
wage.

We have shown how the same reduced form relationship (and hence the

same fon:ulae for the shadow wage) can be specialized to different
technological assuiptions (e.g., the nature of production relationships in
the agricultural and industrial sectors) and institutional settings, as
well as to different behavioral hypotheses.

For example, our formulae for

the shadow wage contain certain critical elasticities which can be
specialized to alternative migration hypotheses (including the
Barris-Todaro case) and to alternative hypotheses concerning wage
determination (including those based on the wage-productiv ity and the
labor turnover effects).
This method has the virtue of analytical siaplicity because it
provides an integrated view of the critical determinants of the shadow
wage.

We have, therefore, been able to derive earlier results on shadow

wages as special cases of our formulae.

Also, we have identified a nur.ber

of new qualitative results concerning the relationship between the shadow
wage and the Earket wage.
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There are several limitations of our analysis which we have pointed
out in the paper.

In particular, we have examined only a limited set of

rigidities; we have not considered, for exaaple, the possibility that
markets other than that for labor may not clear.

Also, our models of

migration and the determination of workers' wages and eamings are
essentially static.

It is possible, for example, that the brunt of the

effects of employment creation in one period are felt in the future.
Aho, we have abstracted from the issues concerning savings and the
alleged scarcity of capital in I.DCs.

In this case, one needs to identify

whether there is any market failure, other than a possible divergence
between the interte11poral distribution of welfare generated by the market
and that preferred by the social planner.

Furthermore, bow individuals

adjust their savings behavior to the government's action may depend
critically on the source of the alleged market failure; for example, on
the nature of problems associated with imperfect information and contract
enforcement which might be responsible for the market failure.
turn, may have a bearing on the magnitude of the shadow wage.

This, in
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FOO'INOTES

•

An earlier version of this paper was released as the National Bureau

of Economic Research Working Paper No. 1229, Cambridge, 1983.
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thank two annonymous referees for their useful coament1.

1.

Though our models can be easily employed to analyze pricing and
tuation in IJ>Cs [see Sah and Stiglitz (1983, 1984a, 1984b)] as well
as the determinant s of other shadow prices.

2.

These parameters, in principle, can be estimated.

3.

An open and a closed economy ere obviously two polar representat ions.

In fact, a variety of trade related rigidities exist in .IJ>Cs. In Sah
and Stiglitz (1983. 1984b), we discuss some of these rigidities in the
context of pricing and taxation.
4.

The term 'equilibriu ' does not necessarily imply a conventiona l
lalrasian equilibriu ; it also denotes temporary equilibria of the

kind that have been recently investigated by Solow and Stiglitz
(1968), Bennasey (1975), and ¥alinvaud (1977), among others.

5.

See Sah and Stiglitz (1984b) for a discussion of the econ011ic reasons
behind the restriction s which IJ)Cs may face on the set of tax-price
instruments they can employ.

6.

It might be useful here to clarify our usage of the term shadoJ wege.
The shadow wage is a sU1111ary statistic which suis up all of the
changes in the economy due to the creation of industrial employment,
multiplied by the social marginal valuation of each of these changes.
The shadow wage excludes the value of the direct output contributed by

the newly employed workers.

As ye shall see later, this statistic is

much more general than another s1UU1ary statistic, opportunity cost of
labor, often employed in the literature, which calculates the net
change in the aggregate output due to employaent creation.
7.

A fixed (real) industrial wage is often justified on the basis of
certain 11.Jlspecified institutional constraints.

But, as ye shall see,

it 11ay be consistent with particular versions of competitive wage
determination when wage-productivity effects are taken bito account.
8.

Throughout the paper, superscript& i "" 1 and 2 de11ote the agricultural
and the industrial sectors respec~ively.

9.

Our analysis focusses on evaluating projects which are of sufficiently
moderate size, so & can be taken as fixed.

10. We exchide only tlie direct contribution, however.

Thus, if industrial

employment cre_ation has indirect repercussions on industrial output
(for example, because of a change in workers' efficiency) then the
indirect effects are not excluded.

Such situations arise later in the

paper.
11. See Peterson (1979), and Bale and Lutz (1979), for example.
12. Some models in which there are no restrictions on the govermient's
ability to impose co1111odity 8Jld factors taxes might predict that there
should be no distortions.
(1971).

See, for example, Diamond and Mirrlees

This is not the optimal policy, however, in the cases

examined later in this paper, or

in_ ■ore

aeneral models, for example,

in Stiglitz and Dasgupta (1971) and in Sah and Stiglitz (1983, 1984b).
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13. The marginal product of an agricultura l worker in this paper is the
number of hours a worker works times the marginal product of one
working hour.

14. Ye assume here that the marginal utility of income is non-increas ing
in incoae.

15. tJnder this set of assumptions . the opportppity coat of labor equals
the shadow wage.
16. Dixit (1968) studied a model without an agricultura l sector. but with
a reserve army of unemployed in the industrial sector.

Members of

this army are subsidized by their working colleagues, such that
everyone consumes the same amount. wt'f/N.

The indirect consmiption

gain to the population from a job creation is w.

correspondi ng shadow wage is:

It follows that the

s = w(l - A/6).

17. ~han 0980) employs a similar representat ion of industrial wage iD the
context of a trade model.
18. Specificall y, let N1 depend on all of the variables in the economy:
tha t is • Nl
N1 , N11 ,

N2-).

c

N (p. w. Nu • --'~ )•

-1

Similarly, in aeneral, w = w(p.

These two expressions and (20), then. yield (19) and

(21) under the conditions which allow the use of the iaplici t function
theorem.

If the econ011y has a wider set of variables then the above

representat ions can be accordingly expanded.

As an example. if there

are different prices in the two sectors. then both of these prices
will appear as arguents of (19) and (21).
19. The •odel of migration proposed in this paper can be further exteJlded
to an economy in which there are several regions which differ from one
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another in resources (e.g., land, population, and skills of workers),
in institutions (e.g •• how workers' earnings are determined), and in
tax regimes (i.e., workers in different reaions face different
prices).
20. The dependence of industrial productivity on other Tariables in the
economy is implicit in (22), throuah an argument similar to that in
footnote 18.

Also, note that (22) is an aagregation over firms'

production functions, each of which can be written (in a symmetric
equilibrium) as: yf = yf(kf, L2 , p, tr), where the superscript f
denotes a firm, and kf is a firm's capital per worker.

In a more

general model, yf will also be a function of the entire distribution
of industrial wages.
21. We should emphasize that these are total derivatives.
22. The expressions for tie shadow wage based on the Barris-Todaro
hypothesis, such as (29) and those to be derived later, are aore
general than they appear.

This is because the only property of the

migration hypothesis which has been actually used here is that the
social welfare can be represented by NV1 •

The resulting expressions

for the shadow wage therefore hold under any migretiop mechanism,
provided the society focusses its attention only on the welfare of
agricultural workers.
23. See Stiglitz (1971, 1974), Barberger (1971) and Heady (1981), among
others.
24. This result can be looked at in an alternative way in an output
maximizing society (see the special case (v) in Section 3B) in which
the earnings (consuption) of

a

worker in both sectors are fixed and,
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therefore, a change in tbe investment is the same as a change in the
output.

The impact on the aggregate output of creating an industrial

job in this econ0111y is the output of one agricultural worker times the
number of such workers who migrate.

Under the Barris-Todaro

hypothesis, this product is just equal to the industrial wage.

To see

this in the simplest case in which everyone is risk-neutral. note
that:

v1 = pl,

v2

= w. and Vu= O.

The loss in output is thus:

(28) then yields:

npl = w.

case, see Stiglitz (1971, 1974).

n = w/pX.

For a di1c~11ion of this simple

Our analysis in this paper is, of

course, much more general and does not depend on these restrictive
ass11111ptions.

2S. See Stiglitz (1982a) for a parallel result.
26~ See Stiglitz (19~1. 1974, 1982a, 1982b), and the references therein.

27. Kore correctly, the productivity also depends on prices [see Sah and
Stiglitz (1984b)].

This dependence is suppressed here because prices

are fixed in the present model.
28. Thia should be contrasted with standard models in which the social
weights on public revenue and on the income of a person are equal if
the income of this person can be controlled by the government.

29. See Sti&litz (1982b).
COIIIJ)lexities.

The wage-quality hypothesis has some additional

For example, if earnings vary across a1ricultural

workers of different abilities, then the effect of a public project on
the quality of agricultural workers also needs to be taken into
account in calculating the shadow wage.
30. For instance, if the output is equally shared among family members,
then there is an attenuation of incentives due to the difference

between the average product and the marginal product. and this
attenuation will be affected if some of the family members migrate to
cities.

Note. however. that there is something slightly peculiar

about such models which ass11111e that social customs dictate an equal
sharing of output within a family. but that social customs can not. or
do not, support efficient 'work-sharing'.
31. If iadividuals' labor supplies are fixed and equal, then Lsh

E

L11 ,

yields: , 1
we
As is obvious, this elasticity does not depend on the

Substitution of these and (36) in

(37).

land distribution within the agricultural sector.
32.

ip/av < 0,

if Wis strictly concave and if the ass1111ption in footnote

14 holds.
·
33 •.Note that in (34), 1f11 is now W1 , and,
in (39).

1

1
we

·a:::

1
1
-dlllw /dlnN •

34. Unlike (38). however, the first tera in the right hand side of (39) is
positive if

I!

u

1
> p,

.
that is,
if invest•ent is socially sore valuable

than an agricultural worker's income.
35. It should be obvious that these signs are valid even if the labor
1

cl

supply is decreasing in the wage rate, provided 'Lw + 'Lw

> O.

36. In fact. our result holds even if the govermnent keeps the wage
'llllchanged. provided agricultural workers are paid less than their
■ arginal

product.

This can be seen directly from (34) and (39), by

1 = o•
•~bstitutina a.,...

,/·
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37. Dixit (1971) and Dixit and Stern (1974).

A related paper is by

Newbery ( 1974) •
38. Blitzer, Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1981) consider this iss11e in the
context of the shadow foreign exchange rate determination.
39. Of course. the aovenment can employ a combination of equilibrating
aechania11s.

The resulting shadow ,rage for any such combination can be

studied by examining the effects of each distinct mechanism.

Note,

however, that the equilibrating mechanism is not always a utter of
choice for the aovenment.

For example, if there are restrictions on

t~e quantities that a country can export or import. then the relevant
shadow wage is the one which is derived in this section.

40. It should be obvious that the expression (45) holds for other
equilibrating aechanis11s as well.

The only paraeter which needs to

be recalculated is t.
41. See footnote 32.
42. See Heady (1981) on this distinction.
43. To see this. substitute (11) into (12), and note that only dJ/dtr'
differs for the two alternative specifications under consideration.
44. See Sah (1982) on the welfare i11Plications of alternative non-price
instruments.
45. See Roberts (1982) and Marchand. Mintz and Pestieau (1983), for
example, on the shadow pricing in the context of a single sector
economy in temporary equil ibriui.
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